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THE AIRPORT NOISE AND CAPACITY ACT OF 1990:
HAS CONGRESS FINALLY SOLVED THE
AIRCRAFT NOISE PROBLEM?
JOHN J. JENKINS JR.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN THE EARLY days of aviation, conflicts between air-
port proprietors and nearby landowners over aircraft
noise were rare. Airports were small and generally lo-
cated away from noise sensitive areas. The few planes tak-
ing off and landing at airports were propeller driven and
relatively quiet. This situation changed, however, with
the advent of the jet age and the rapid expansion of air
travel as a major component of the nation's transporta-
tion system. The number of take-offs and landings stead-
ily increased, and the airplanes grew larger and louder.
Today, airports have grown to enormous proportions
and the volume of air traffic continues to grow. This
growth of airports and air traffic has brought with it a seri-
ous problem: how should society balance the rights of
persons owning property near airports to enjoy their land
with the community's need for air travel facilities. This
problem has been addressed several times without success
in the past twenty to thirty years and only promises to be-
come worse in the future as the number of take-offs and
landings at the nation's airports continues to increase.'
I In 1987, U.S. domestic air carriers carried 450 million passengers or almost
double the number carried in 1978. Task Force Predicts Airport Capacity Crunch,
TRAFFIC WORLD, Apr. 4, 1988, at 15 [hereinafter Task Force]. By the year 2000, the
number of passengers carried by domestic U.S. air carriers is expected to reach
750 million. Id.
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In response to the growing aircraft noise problem, Con-
gress passed the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990.2
The Airport Noise and Capacity Act is significant because
it shifts authority for noise abatement away from local
governments and airport proprietors and grants the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) authority on all noise
restrictions on aircraft.3 Airport operators, airlines, and
citizens groups all hope this shift toward a national solu-
tion will lead to less litigation and more cooperation be-
tween the groups to find a solution to the growing aircraft
noise problem. This comment provides a review of some
of the major judicial decisions which have shaped noise
abatement law, prior legislative attempts to solve the air-
craft noise problem, and a discussion of the regulatory
scheme established by the Airport Noise and Capacity Act
of 1990 and its chances for success.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. UNITED STATES V. CAUSBY
The first major judicial treatment of the subject of air-
craft noise was United States v. Causby.4 In Causby, the
United States Supreme Court upheld a cause of action for
the taking of property by aircraft noise under the theory
of inverse condemnation.5 Causby involved damage to the
plaintiffs' chicken farm caused by the noise and bright
lights of frequent, low-level overhead flights by military
aircraft taking off and landing at a nearby municipal air-
port leased by the federal government. The plaintiffs al-
leged the low-level flights caused damage to both their
chicken farming business and their personal health.
The Court held that the noise and lights from the
2 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2151-2158 (Supp. 1994).
3 Airport Noise Abatement Has Entered New Era, Attorney Says, 10 AIRPORTS 503
(1993).
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Id. at 266-67. In an inverse condemnation suit the plaintiff alleges that his
property has been taken for public use without just compensation as required by
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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planes did constitute a taking of property by inverse con-
demnation compensable under the Fifth Amendment. 6 In
discussing what constitutes a taking of property, the Court
stated that "[filights over private land are not a taking,
unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct
and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use
of the land."7 Causby clearly established the principle that
landowners are to be compensated for diminution in
value of their land and other damages caused by aircraft
noise. 8
The Causby decision is also significant because it recog-
nizes the conflicting interests of the public in the use of
airspace9 and the right of landowners to the use and en-
joyment of their land.' 0 In recognizing these conflicting
interests, the Court expressly rejected the common law
doctrine that the property owner owns and controls his
land from the center of the earth to the far reaches of the
universe." The Court's rejection of this common law rule
and recognition that the navigable airspace is in the public
domain was an important step in the development of air-
space law.
B. GRIGGS V. ALLEGHENY COUNTY
Griggs v. Allegheny County was the next significant aircraft
6 Causby, 328 U.S. at 267.
7 Id. at 266.
8 The measure of damages in an inverse condemnation suit is limited to the loss
in value to the plaintiffs property. Id. at 261.
9 The Court stated:
The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not
true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to
countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To rec-
ognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these high-
ways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the
public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which
only the public has a just claim.
Id.
'0 "The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he
can occupy or use in connection with the land." Id. at 264.
1 Id. at 260-61.
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noise case heard by the Supreme Court.'2 Griggs focused
on the determination of liability for damages to property
caused by aircraft noise from a newly constructed airport.
The owners of a house located near the end of a runway at
the Pittsburgh Airport brought suit alleging that their
property had been taken as a result of noise and vibration
from aircraft passing overhead.
The Court held that the overhead flights in question
were so low and frequent as to constitute a compensable
taking of property by inverse condemnation.' 3 The most
important aspect of this case, however, is the Court's as-
signment of all responsibility for damages suffered by the
landowner to the airport operator.' 4 The Court held that,
although the federal government had approved all plans
for the airport and established federal regulations con-
cerning airport construction, the federal government
could not be held liable for any portion of the property
owner's damages.' 5 The Court stated that the federal
government did not choose the site for the construction
of the airport, the direction and length of runways, nor
the amount of land needed for the airport's construc-
tion.' 6 These decisions were made by the airport opera-
tor and, therefore, the Court reasoned, the airport
operator should bear the cost of acquiring any additional
approach area needed for the operation of the airport.' 7
The Court decided that the air carriers using the airport
were similarly not liable for damages because they were
merely complying with the requirements of the federal
government relating to aircraft operation.'" The Court's
12 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
13 Id. at 90. The flights which were continuous, regular, daily flights, often only
several minutes apart, and passed near the plaintiffs' residence. During the over-
flights, the windows of the residence rattled and at times plaster fell from the walls
and ceilings. The noise made it impossible for the plaintiffs to converse, to talk on
the telephone, or to sleep, even when using ear plugs and sleeping pills.
14 Id. at 89-90.
15 Id.
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decision imposing all liability for damages resulting from
aircraft noise on the airport operator has been consist-
ently upheld in cases following Griggs.19
C. CITY OF BURBANK V. LOCKHEED AIR TERMINAL
Another important issue developed during litigation
over aircraft noise is the extent to which state and local
governments and airport operators may regulate air traffic
and the resulting aircraft noise. The Supreme Court at-
tempted to settle this issue in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc..20 In'Burbank, a city regulation restricted the
permissible times of flights in and out of the Burbank air-
port.2' The city ordinance 22 made it unlawful for jet air-
craft to take off from the airport between the hours of
11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., and made it unlawful for the
airport operator to permit planes to take off during those
hours.23 The airport owner and operator brought suit
seeking an injunction against enforcement of the
ordinance.
The Court struck down the ordinance and held that the
Noise Control Act of 197224 preempted state and local ac-
tion in the field of noise control. 25 The Court expressly
stopped short of addressing the limits applicable when
the city or municipality owns the airport and acts as its
19 See Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975); State of
Illinois ex rel Scott v. Butterfield, 396 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1975); San Diego
Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Ct. (Britt), 136 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 859 (1977); Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Ct. App.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); City of Los Angeles v. Japan Air Lines
Co., 116 Cal. Rptr. 69 (Ct. App. 1974).
20 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
21 Id. at 625-26.
22 BURBANK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 20-32.1 (1973).
23 Burbank, 411 U.S. at 625-26. The ordinance however, provided an exception
for emergency flights approved by the City Police Department. BURBANK, CAL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 20-32.1.
24 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1976 & Supp. 1994).
25 Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633-37 (holding that although the statute did not pro-
vide for express preemption in the statute, preemption can occur either where
federal legislation is so pervasive that it leaves no room for state regulation or
where federal interests are so dominant that state regulation should be
precluded).
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proprietor rather than as a governmental entity regulating
aircraft noise through the state's traditional police
power.26 The Court did not reach this issue because of a
letter from the Secretary of Transportation submitted to
Congress during debate over the Noise Control Act of
1972.27 The Secretary's letter expressed the view that the
Act should not affect the rights of states and local agen-
cies to issue regulations in their capacity as operators of
an airport.28 This limitation in the Court's holding has
become known as the Proprietor's Exemption.
The scope of federal preemption and the Proprietor's
Exemption established in the Burbank decision has been
the subject of several cases with courts frequently in disa-
greement over the extent of permissible state or local
control. 29 Some recent decisions have held that proprie-
tors may not directly regulate the frequency of takeoffs
nor establish curfews for aircraft activity because these
measures are preempted by federal law.3 0 Federal law,
26 Id. at 635. The Court differentiated between cases involving an exercise of
the police power, like Burbank, and cases involving a municipality's use of its
power as owner and proprietor of an airport. The Court stated that the power of
the municipality in the two situations is not the same, but failed to state the limits
on a municipality acting as an airport proprietor.
27 49 U.S.C. § 1431.
28 Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635. The Secretary of Transportation's letter is re-
printed in S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2688, 2693-94.
29 See Harrison v. Schwartz, 572 A.2d 528 (Md.) (holding that despite a lack of
direct conflict between federal and municipal regulations, the regulations are
nonetheless preempted due to Congressional intent to occupy the field), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 143 (1990). But see Arrow Air, Inc. v. Port Auth., 602 F. Supp. 314
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (allowing proprietor-imposed noise level restrictions because
they were non-discriminatory, did not conflict with FAA purposes, and did not
violate the Commerce Clause); National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp.
417 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that airport owners acting as proprietors may deny
aircraft access to the airport based on non-discriminatory noise considerations);
Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (stating that a
proprietor's right to control the use of an airport is a necessary and well-estab-
lished concomitant of the proprietor's responsibility for the consequences of the
airport's operation).
1o See, e.g., Harrison, 572 A.2d at 532. "[O]ccupation of the field does not mean
every blade of grass within it must be subject to express federal control; it means
only that congressional intent demonstrates that the area is subject to exclusive
federal control, whether potential or actual." Id.
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the courts reason, occupies this entire field of regulation,
thereby precluding any state or local regulation.3 '
Other courts, however, have rejected the total federal
preemption argument.32 In a recent case, Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport Board v. City of Irving,3 the court
squarely addressed the issue of federal preemption of mu-
nicipal authority and rejected the total federal preemption
argument. In this case, cities surrounding the Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport attempted to use local zon-
ing ordinances to block the expansion of the airport and
the construction of two new runways.3 4 The court
granted summary judgment in favor of the cities, permit-
ting the challenge to expansion. 5
The court acknowledged the substantial amount of fed-
eral regulation of aircraft operations, but distinguished
those issues from the physical expansion of the borders of
an existing airport.36 The court ruled that matters con-
cerning airport expansion were entirely different from
matters affecting aircraft operation. The court stated:
Federal preemption would clearly apply were this a case of
a more "classic" nature, e.g., adjacent cities attempting to
regulate noise, establish a curfew, limit landing weight, or
otherwise regulate aircraft at an existing facility. The criti-
cal circumstance here, however, is not the day-to-day op-
eration of an existing airport but a planned $3.5 billion
expansion, including a territorial expansion. 7
The court determined that Congress had the power to
regulate issues surrounding airport expansions, but that
existing regulation and case law indicated that it had not
yet done so.3 8 The current trend regarding preemption
3' Id.
32 See supra note 29.
31 No. 90-4298-I, (162d Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex., Oct. 8, 1991), aff'd, 854
S.W.2d 161 (Tex. App.-Dallas), vacated as moot, 868 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1993).
3 See Bridgette Y. Rose & Leona Allen, Suburbs Hold OffDFW Expansion, DALLAS
TIMES HERALD, Oct. 9, 1991, at Al.
5 Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd. v. City of Irving, No. 90-4298-1 at 9.
Id. at 6-7.
37 Id. at 5.
38 Id. at 9.
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of state and local regulations appears to be toward accept-
ance of concurrent regulation, so long as compliance with
the local regulations does not make compliance with fed-
eral regulations impossible.39 The enactment of the Air-
port Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 may make this
preemption argument moot by requiring that all local re-
strictions comply with the 1990 Act's standards.40
III. LEGISLATION AND REGULATION OF
AIRCRAFT NOISE
The majority of legislation regulating aircraft noise
comes from the federal government. Air travel is consid-
ered a part of interstate commerce and, as such, is subject
to federal regulation under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.4 ' Congress has exercised this authority by
enacting a broad range of legislation covering many areas
of airport operation and aircraft noise.42
A. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
In 1958, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act 43
granting the FAA the power to determine which aircraft
and aircraft engines are permitted to be operated within
the United States.4 4 Since the primary purpose of the act
was to ensure aircraft safety and the safety of persons on
the ground, there was no attempt to use the act to address
the aircraft noise problem.4 5 The FAA did not think
aircraft noise was a safety factor, and therefore believed it
lacked authority under the act to accept or reject aircraft
designs and aircraft engines based on noise
39 Ronald D. Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption, 5 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 311, 312 (1988).
40 See infra notes 81-161 and accompanying text.
41 The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce ... among the several States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
42 See infra notes 43-80 and accompanying text.
1- Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1542 (1976 & Supp. 1994)).
44 Id.
45 Donald V. Harper, Regulation of Aircraft Noise at Major Airports: Past, Present,
and Future, 17 TRANSP. L. J. 117, 141 (1988).
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considerations 46
Noise considerations did not become an important fac-
tor in deliberations regarding any jet aircraft or engine
design until new legislation was passed during 1968-69.4'
Prior to that time, the FAA relied upon voluntary cooper-
ation among aircraft and engine manufacturers, the air-
lines, and airport operators to solve aircraft noise
problems. 48 The FAA could have broadly interpreted the
language of the Federal Aviation Act granting it authority
to develop rules for the protection of persons and prop-
erty on the ground 4 9 to include protection from aircraft
noise, but at the time officials were more concerned with
other factors. Specifically, safety and economic issues
were the FAA's primary concerns in the development of
planes and engines, not noise.5 °
B. 1968 AMENDMENT TO THE 1958 ACT
The FAA did not become directly involved in the noise
regulation and reduction debate until 1968 when Con-
gress passed an Amendment to the 1958 Federal Aviation
Act5 ' specifically granting the FAA the power to include
noise considerations as a factor in approving aircraft and
aircraft engines.52 The amendment further directed the
FAA to develop standards for measuring aircraft noise
and to provide for the control and abatement of aircraft
noise at the source.5 3 The act also gave the FAA the au-
46 Id.
.7 49 U.S.C. § 1431. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
48 Harper, supra note 45, at 141.
49 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1).
- Harper, supra note 45, at 142. There were early indications that the noise
problem was becoming serious, but public officials did not show much interest
until the late 1960's.
51 Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1431
(1976 & Supp. 1994)).
52 Id.
53 Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1431
(1976 & Supp. 1994)). The statute provided that the FAA "prescribe and amend
such regulations as the FAA may find necessary to provide for the control and
abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom, including the application of such
standards and regulations in the issuance, amendment, modification, suspension,
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thority to grant exemption from federal rules and regula-
tions regarding control and abatement of aircraft noise
when that exemption furthered the public interest.54
C. FEDERAL AVIATION RULE 36
The FAA responded to the directive in the 1968
Amendment one year later by issuing Federal Aviation
Rule 36 (FAR 36).55 FAR 36 established precise proce-
dures for measuring aircraft noise 56 and proscribed noise
limits for aircraft based on size and number of engines.
The regulations did not have a significant impact on the
industry, however, and were a disappointment to anti-
noise groups because the regulations did not apply to pre-
existing aircraft designs. 58 The regulations applied only
to those aircraft designs for which certification was sought
after December 1969.59 The Act was a great disappoint-
ment because it failed to require or actively promote the
development of new noise reduction technology.60
D. NOISE CONTROL ACT OF 1972
Congress' next major attempt to address the aircraft
or revocation of any certificate authorized by this subchapter." 49 U.S.C.
§ 1431(b)(l). This statute marked the beginning of the FAA's use of the certifica-
tion process to control aircraft noise. This practice has continued to the present
and aircraft are now classified according to their noise levels.
4 Id. § 1431(c) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1431(e)). The statute provided
for the grant of an exemption if there is a finding that "the public health and
welfare do not require the affirmation of such an order, or that such an order is
not consistent with safety in air commerce or air transportation." Id.
5 Adoption of Noise Type Certification Standards and Procedures, 34 Fed.
Reg. 18,355 (1969) (codified at various sections of 14 C.F.R. § 21 and 14 C.F.R.
§ 36 (1993)).
56 14 C.F.R. § 36.101 (1993).
57 Id. § 36.201 & app. B.
58 James F. Carr, Aviation Faces Turbulence Over Airport Noise Pollution, A.B.A. TORT
AND INS. PRAC. SEC. 2 (1984).
59 The FAA amended FAR 36 in 1973, making it applicable to older aircraft
designs manufactured after December 1, 1973, but these regulations did not take
effect until 1977. Carr, supra note 58; see Noise Standards for Newly Produced
Airplanes of Older Type Design, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,569 (1973) (codified at 14
C.F.R. § 21.183(e) and 14 C.F.R. § 36.1(a)(d)(1-3) (1993)).
- See Joseph F. Vittek, Jr., Airport Noise Control - Can Communities Live Without It?
Can Airlines Live With It?, 38J. AIR L. & COM. 473, 517 (1972).
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noise issue was the Noise Control Act of 1972.61 The
1972 Act authorized the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to take a role in the regulation of aircraft
noise and instructed the EPA to conduct a study of the
adequacy of the FAA noise regulations. The EPA was to
recommend further noise control regulations as necessary
to protect the public health and welfare. 62 The FAA, how-
ever, retained the right to reject any of the EPA-recom-
mended regulations if the regulations would compromise
safety or if they were not technologically or economically
feasible.63 To the dismay of anti-noise activists, the FAA
failed to implement many of the EPA recommendations.6 4
The 1972 Act also amended provisions of the 1968
Amendment authorizing the FAA to grant exemptions to
the noise abatement standards established in FAR 36.65
The 1972 Act required the FAA to consult with the EPA
prior to the FAA granting exemptions from the noise
abatement regulations.66 The FAA did, however, retain
the authority to grant exemptions without EPA approval if
the FAA determined that safety in air commerce or air
transportation required action before the EPA could be
61 Pub. L. No. 92-574, 92 Stat. 1239 (codifed as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1431
(1976 & Supp. 1994)).
62 49 U.S.C. § 1431(c)(1). The act required the FAA to publish the proposed
regulations from the EPA within thirty days of submission to the FAA. Id. The
FAA was then required to hold public hearings within sixty days of such publica-
tion to provide interested parties the opportunity for oral and written presenta-
tions of their data, views, and arguments. Id.
63 Id. § 1431(c)(1)(A) & (B). The FAA was required to accept or reject the
EPA's proposed regulations. If the FAA rejected the proposed EPA regulations, it
was then required to publish notice in the Federal Register that no regulations
were being prescribed in response to the EPA's proposals, along with a detailed
explanation of the reasons for not prescribing the regulations at that time. Id.
6 Marin K. North, Current State of the Law in Aircraft Noise Pollution Control, 43J.
AIR L. & CoM. 799, 813-22 (1977). Several states actually filed lawsuits against the
federal government and the FAA for failure to implement the EPA recommenda-
tions. U.S. Studies State Suit Seeking Mandatory Response on Noise, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 1, 1976, at 29.
65 See 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1).
66 Id. The statute states that "[n]o exemption with respect to any standard or
regulation under this section may be granted under any provision of this chapter
unless the FAA shall have consulted with EPA before such exemption is granted."
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consulted. 67
E. THE AVIATION SAFETY AND NOISE ABATEMENT
ACT OF 1979
The Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 197968
was passed in response to the need for a comprehensive
noise abatement program and the financial burdens im-
posed on U.S. air carriers attempting to meet the FAR 36
noise limitations.6 9  To lessen the economic burden on
airlines caused by the FAR 36 regulations, the 1979 Act
granted air carriers exemptions from the deadlines im-
posed for compliance with noise level requirements of
FAR 36 for all two- and three- engine aircraft. 70 The 1979
Act is also noteworthy because it marked the first time the
federal government attempted to reduce the impact of air-
craft noise rather than focusing its efforts solely on reduc-
ing the noise at the source. 7' To reduce the impact of
aircraft noise, the 1979 Act established a system for vol-
untary noise compatibility planning by airport proprie-
67 Id. In cases where the FAA granted an exemption without EPA approval, the
FAA was required to consult with the EPA as soon as practicable after the exemp-
tion was granted.
Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat. 50 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2101-2125 (Supp. 1994)).
- U.S. air carriers had been ordered in 1976 to bring their fleets into compli-
ance with the FAR 36 noise limits by January 1, 1985, through the replacement of
aircraft and retrofitting of engines. Phased Compliance With Part 36 Noise Limits
By Turbojets With Maximum Weights Greater Than 75,000 Pounds, 41 Fed. Reg.
56,046 (1976) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1993)).
70 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2123-2124. The act extended the deadline for two- and
three-engine aircraft to January 1, 1983, if the carrier had a plan for the replace-
ment of the aircraft with one that met the new FAA noise standards and if the
carrier had entered into a binding contract by January 1, 1983, for the delivery of
the replacement aircraft. Id. § 2123. The compliance deadline was moved to Jan-
uary 1, 1985 for three-engine aircraft and to January 1, 1986 for two-engine air-
craft. Id. The act also provided a "Small Community Service Exemption" that
extended the time for compliance by two-engine aircraft from January 1, 1983, to
January 1, 1985, for aircraft with more than 100 seats, and to January 1, 1988, for
aircraft with 100 or fewer seats. Id. § 2124.
71 Id. §§ 2102-2106. The statute provided for: 1) a uniform system of noise
measurement and identification of land uses compatible with noise exposure; 2)
preparation of noise exposure maps; 3) funding of noise compatibility planning;
and, 4) the establishment of a noise compatibility program. Carr, supra note 58, at
2.
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tors.72 Under the plan, the FAA developed a uniform
system for measuring aircraft noise levels 73 and deter-
mined compatible land uses for areas with various noise
levels.74 Using this information, airport proprietors were
to develop a noise exposure map for their airport area
pointing out problem noise areas.7 5
After completion of the noise compatibility map, the
airport operator qualified for federal grants to develop a
noise compatibility program. 76 These noise compatibility
programs included such measures as the implementation
of a preferential runway system, restrictions on the use of
certain airports by certain types of aircraft because of the
aircraft's noise level, construction of barriers and acousti-
cal shields, use of alternative flight procedures, and the
acquisition of land near the airport to ensure uses com-
patible with noise levels.77 Airport proprietors benefited
from the program through federal grants to pay for the
noise reduction program. In addition, the noise exposure
map enabled airport operators to limit their potential lia-
bility to property owners by notifying potential purchas-
ers of property near the airport of the potentially high
noise levels. Persons purchasing property near an airport
72 49 U.S.C. app. § 2103. Under the act, noise compatibility planning was de-
fined as the development of information necessary to prepare and submit a noise
exposure map and related information, or the development of a noise compatibil-
ity program to reduce the effects of the noise. Id.
73 Id. § 2102. The act provided for the establishment of a single system for
noise measurement "for which there is a highly reliable relationship between pro-
jected noise exposure and surveyed reactions of people to noise, to be uniformly
applied in measuring the noise at airports and the areas surrounding such air-
ports." Id. § 2102(1). The system of measurement was to consider noise intensity,
duration, frequency, and time of occurrence, among other factors. Id. § 2102(2).
74 Id. § 2102(3).
75 Id. § 2103.
76 Id. § 2103(b)(1). Section 2103(b)(1) authorizes the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to make the grants for noise compatibility planning. Id. Section 2104 de-
scribes the actual noise compatibility program. Id. § 2104.
77 49 U.S.C. app. § 2104(a)(l)-(5). The alternative flight procedures may in-
clude a steep climb out on take off, a reduction in thrust immediately after takeoff,
or requiring aircraft to turn away from noise sensitive areas after takeoff. Harper,
supra note 45, at 125. During landing, noise can be reduced by requiring pilots to
take the steepest landing slope consistent with safety regulations or by requiring
pilots to use low power when at lower altitudes. Id.
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which has a noise exposure map are not entitled to recov-
ery for damages resulting from aircraft noise from the air-
port if they had actual or constructive knowledge of the
existence of the noise exposure map.78 To successfully
bring suit, the purchaser must prove that there has been a
significant change in either the type or frequency of the
aircraft operation at the airport, the airport layout, the
flight patterns, or an increase in night operations, and
that their damages resulted from the change or increase.79
Although each of the major Congressional actions ad-
dressing aircraft noise has helped to alleviate the problem
to a degree, none has been able to fully solve the prob-
lem. As the volume of air traffic grew at a rapidly increas-
ing rate,80 each of these Congressional programs proved
inadequate. The solution to the aircraft noise problem re-
quired a more aggressive, comprehensive approach on a
national level.
V. THE AIRPORT NOISE AND CAPACITY
ACT OF 1990
In response to the failure of earlier legislation to ade-
quately solve the aircraft noise problem and to counteract
the proliferation of onerous local noise restrictions im-
posed at individual airports by local airport operators,
Congress passed the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of
1990 (ANCA) a' in the waning hours of the 1990 Congres-
78 49 U.S.C. app. § 2107(b). The act provides that, at a minimum, constructive
knowledge will be imputed to a purchaser if, prior to the date of the acquisition,
notice of the existence of the noise map was published at least three times in a
newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the property is located or
if the purchaser was given a copy of the noise exposure map at the time of the
acquisition. Id.
79 Id. § 2107(a). See generally Harper, supra note 45, at 127-31.
80 The number of passengers on domestic air carriers almost doubled from
1978 to 1987. Task Force, supra note 1, at 15. The number of passengers carried by
domestic carriers is expected to grow from 450 million in 1987 to 750 million by
the year 2000. Id.
81 Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 102-558, 106 Stat. 4217 (codified at 49
U.S.C. app. §§ 2151-2158 (Supp. 1994)).
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sional session.82 Hailed by many in the aviation industry
as the most significant piece of aviation legislation since
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the ANCA was
pushed through Congress with the support of the Bush
administration and the major United States airlines.83
The ANCA's proponents claim the Act is a significant step
in the noise abatement battle which will remove noisier
aircraft from the skies, make the environment quieter for
residents around airports, and establish a uniform proce-
dure for use by all airport authorities in the implementa-
tion of future restrictions on aircraft operations and the
establishment of noise limits. 84 Supporters predict the act
will result in a reduction in the number of persons ex-
posed to significant aircraft noise from 2.7 million in 1991
to 400,000 by the year 2000, a decrease of eighty-five per-
cent.8 5 The Act's opponents, including many local noise
groups, believe the Act will allow air carriers to keep their
noisiest planes in the skies, actually increase the noise
problem around airports because of an increasing number
of aircraft in operation, and prevent state and local au-
thorities from enacting noise and access restrictions of
their own.8 6
The ANCA consists of two related programs. Designed
82 Sidney A. Shapiro, Lessons From a Public Policy Failure.: EPA and Noise Abatement,
19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1992).
85 Samuel Skinner, Secretary of Transportation, and Admiral James B. Busey,
FAA Administrator, News Conference Announcing Issuance of Regulations Im-
plementing the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 (Sept. 24, 1991) available
in LEXIS, FEDERAL LEXIS, NEXIS LIBRARY, STATE NEWS SERVICE FILE.
The airlines favored the passage of the ANCA because of the growing number
of aircraft noise and aircraft access restrictions imposed by state and local govern-
ments at individual airports across the country. The airlines favored legislation
creating a national aviation policy and restricting the ability of state and local gov-
ernments to impose restrictions on aircraft operations, particularly on newer, qui-
eter aircraft.
84 Id.
85 Christopher P. Fotos, FAA Noise Rules Give Carriers Flexibility in Meeting Deadline
for Stage 2 Aircraft, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 30, 1991, at 34; see Skinner,
supra note 83. These figures are both down from a high of seven million people
exposed to significant aircraft noise in 1975.
Kate McKenna, Tempers Take Off at New Aviation Rules, STATES NEWS SERVICE,
Sept. 24, 1991; FAA Has Noise Reduction Proposal to Please Everybody-and Nobody, Avi-
ATION DAILY, Feb. 27, 1991, at 379.
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to balance the interests of the airlines and persons resid-
ing near airports, the ANCA's drafters attempted to cre-
ate programs to appease each of these groups. The first,
intended to quiet air carriers' complaints concerning local
restrictions on aircraft noise and access at airports, estab-
lishes a national aviation noise policy.8 7 This national avi-
ation noise policy limits the authority of local and state
governments to impose restrictions on Stage 1188 aircraft8 9
and prohibits local or state governments from passing any
regulations restricting the operation of Stage 11190 aircraft
without FAA approval or the agreement of the airlines. 9'
The second aspect of the ANCA, meant to address the
concerns of noise control groups, provides for the phas-
ing-out of all Stage II aircraft operated in or out of U.S.
airports by the year 2000.92 The details of these two pro-
grams are discussed below.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
To bring uniformity to the numerous restrictions im-
posed by individual airport operators, the ANCA directed
the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to issue regu-
lations establishing a national aviation noise policy no
later than July 1, 1991.93 In developing the national noise
policy, the Act directed the Secretary to consider the find-
ings, determinations, and provisions of the ANCA; an
87 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2152-2156.
88 Stage II aircraft are aircraft that meet the 1969 noise standards established by
FAR 36. See Adoption of Noise Type Certification Standards and Procedures, 14
C.F.R. § 36 (1993).
89 49 U.S.C. app. § 2153(c), 2154. The Act established a review process for
airports proposing restrictions on Stage II aircraft and established procedures to
be followed before any Stage II restrictions may take effect. Id.
Stage III aircraft are those aircraft designs that applied for certification on or
after November 5, 1975 and are required to meet the noise levels established in
1977-78 which are lower that those set for Stage II aircraft. See Noise Limits for
Subsonic Transport Category Large Airplanes and Turbojet Powered Airplanes,
14 C.F.R. § 36.201 (1993). The most popular Stage lI aircraft is the Boeing 727.
The 727 is being replaced by the new Boeing 757 which meets the Stage III
requirements.
91 49 U.S.C. app. § 2153(b), (d), (e).
92 Id. §§ 2157, 2158.
93 Id. § 2152(a).
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economic analysis of the impact on the airline industry of
the phasing-out Stage I194 aircraft and their replacement
with quieter Stage II195 aircraft;9 6 and existing law. 7
Along with the regulations establishing the national avia-
tion noise policy, the Secretary was instructed to submit
recommendations concerning: 1) changes in the stan-
dards and procedures governing the rights of state and
local governments to restrict airport operations in order
to limit aircraft noise; 2) the need for changes in the pro-
cedures governing lawsuits brought by persons adversely
affected by aircraft noise; 3) changes in federal regulation
of the airspace in order to better account for environmen-
tal effects; 4) the need for changes in the manner in which
the federal government provides assistance in noise
abatement planning and programs, including the need for
mandatory requirements or greater incentives for local re-
strictions on the use of noise impacted land; and 5) any
further recommendations necessary to implement the na-
tional aviation noise policy.98
To implement these new standards and procedures, the
ANCA created a national program for the review of air-
port noise and access restrictions on Stage II and Stage
III aircraft issued by individual airport proprietors.99 The
national program of review applies to all Stage II aircraft
restrictions proposed after October 1, 1990,100 and all
See supra note 88.
95 See supra note 90.
9 The Act directed that the national policy be based upon a detailed economic
analysis of:
the impact of the phaseout date for Stage 2 aircraft on competition
in the airline industry, including the ability of air carriers to achieve
capacity growth consistent with the projected rate of growth for the
airline industry, the impact of competition within the airline and air-
cargo industries, the impact on nonhub and small community air
service, and the impact on new entry into the airline industry.
49 U.S.C. § 2152(b).
91 Id. § 2152(a).
98 Id. §§ 2152(c)(1)-(6). The regulations prescribed by the Secretary in re-
sponse to this section of the Act are codified in Notice and Approval of Airport
Noise and Access Restrictions, 14 C.F.R. § 161-161.505 (1993).
99 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2153(a)-(h), 2154.
100 Id. § 2153(a)(2)(A).
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Stage III aircraft restrictions effective after October 1,
1990.101 The Act does, however, provide exemptions for
certain types of agreements and actions in effect prior to
the date of the ANCA's enactment (Nov. 5, 1990).102 The
ANCA also provides an exemption where, prior to the en-
actment of the Act, the FAA and an airport operator had
formed a working group to examine the potential noise
impacts of changes in air traffic control procedures.10 3
In reviewing restrictions on Stage III aircraft, the na-
tional aviation noise program provides that no restrictions
scheduled to take effect after October 1, 1990 shall be ef-
fective unless they are agreed to by the airport proprietor
and all aircraft operators or have been submitted to and
approved by the Secretary pursuant to an airport or air-
craft operator's request for approval as provided in
§ 2153(a) of the Act. 10 4 The Secretary is required to ap-
"0, Id. § 2153(a)(2)(B).
102 Id. § 2153(a)(2)(C)(i)-(vi). The Act specifically provided an exemption for:
1) a local action to enforce a negotiated or executed airport noise
or access agreement between the airport operator and the aircraft
operator in effect on November 5, 1990;
2) a local action to enforce a negotiated or executed airport aircraft
noise or access restriction the airport operator and the aircraft oper-
ators agreed to before November 5, 1990;
3) an intergovernmental agreement including airport aircraft noise
or access restriction in effect on November 5, 1990;
4) a subsequent amendment to an airport aircraft noise or access
agreement or restriction in effect on November 5, 1990 that does
not reduce or limit aircraft operations or affect aircraft safety;
5) (I) a restriction which was adopted by an airport operator on or
before October 1, 1990, and which was stayed as of October 1, 1990,
by a court order or as a result of litigation, if such restriction or a
part thereof is subsequently allowed by a court to take effect; and (II)
in any case in which a restriction described in subclause (I) is either
partially or totally disallowed by a court, any new restriction im-
posed by an airport operator to replace such disallowed restriction if
such new restriction would not prohibit aircraft operations in effect
as of November 5, 1990; and this Act.
6) a local actions which represents the adoption of the final portion
of a program of a staged airport aircraft noise or access restriction
where the initial portion of such program was adopted during calen-
dar year 1988 and was in effect on November 5, 1990.
Id.
d03 Id. § 2153(a)(2)(D).
-o Id. § 2153(b).
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prove or reject requests for approval no later than 180
days after their submission.105 For a noise or access re-
striction on Stage III aircraft to win approval from the
Secretary, the Secretary must find that the following con-
ditions are supported by substantial evidence:
1) [t]he proposed restriction is reasonable, nonarbitrary,
and nondiscriminatory; 2) [t]he proposed restriction does
not create an undue burden on interstate or foreign com-
merce; 3) [t]he proposed restriction is not inconsistent
with maintaining the safe and efficient utilization of the
navigable airspace; 4) [t]he proposed restriction does not
conflict with any existing Federal statute or regulation; 5)
[t]here has been an adequate opportunity for public com-
ment with respect to the restriction; 6) [t]he proposed re-
striction does not create an undue burden on the national
aviation system.'o 6
In reviewing restrictions on operations of Stage II air-
craft, the Secretary is not permitted to approve
restrictions
unless the airport operator publishes the proposed noise
and access restriction and prepares and makes available
for public comment at least 180 days before the effective
date of the restriction:
1) an analysis of the anticipated or actual costs and bene-
fits of the existing or proposed noise or access restriction;
2) a description of alternative restrictions; and 3) a de-
scription of the alternative measures considered which do
not involve aircraft restrictions, and a comparison of the
costs and benefits of such alternative measures to the costs
and benefits of the proposed noise or access restriction. 0 7
Although compliance with the provisions of the ANCA
is not mandatory, the Act provides significant penalties
for noncompliance, virtually ensuring compliance by local
airport operators. An airport proprietor operating under
airport aircraft noise or access restrictions not in con-
105 Id. § 2153(d)(1).
-o6 Id. § 2153(d)(2)(A)-(F).
107 Id. § 2153(c)(I)-(3).
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formity with the national aviation policy prescribed by the
ANCA risks losing its eligibility to collect passenger facil-
ity fees0 8 and to receive grants authorized by the Airport
and Airway Improvement Act of 1982.109 The Act pro-
vides that any restriction on Stage 111110 aircraft which be-
comes effective after October 1, 1990, and has not been
approved by the airport operator and aircraft operators or
by the Secretary under 49 U.S.C. app. § 2153(a), places
the airport operator in noncompliance with the ANCA.II'
In addition to the provision solely concerning Stage III
restrictions, the ANCA includes a general provision appli-
cable to both Stage II and Stage III aircraft stating that
any airport operator imposing a noise or access restriction
not in compliance with the ANCA may not, under any
condition, receive revenue under the Airport and Airway
Improvement Act of 1982 or impose or collect a passen-
ger facility charge." 12
108 A passenger facility fee is a fee charged to persons departing from or con-
necting through an airport. At an airport such as Dallas/Fort Worth International
Airport, which serves as a hub for two airlines (American Airlines and Delta Air-
lines), the fees can amount to as much as $75 million per year. David Nather, D/
FW Could Use Tax for Runways, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 31, 1990, at 25A. In
cities such as New York that are major centers for both international and domestic
air travel, the amount of passenger facility charges collected can reach as high as
$120 million per year. FAA Officials Take Hard Line Against Further Noise Rules, AIR-
PORTS, Nov. 5, 1991, at 457.
0 49 U.S.C. app. § 2204. Grants under the Airport and Airway Improvement
Act of 1982 are paid out of a trust fund and may be used by airports for both
capital expenditures, such as runways, and normal operating needs. Id.
110 The Act provides a nonexclusive list of restrictions on Stage III aircraft cov-
ered by the ANCA. The list includes:
1) a restriction as to noise levels generated on either a single event
or cumulative basis; 2) a limit, direct or indirect, on the total number
of Stage 3 aircraft operations; 3) a noise budget or noise allocation
program which would include Stage 3 aircraft; 4) a restriction impos-
ing limits on hours of operation; and 5) any other limit on Stage 3
aircraft.
49 U.S.C. § 2153(b)(l)-(5).
I Id. § 2153(e).
11 Id. § 2156. The procedure for revocation of eligibility for the passenger fa-
cility charge and the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 is set out in 14
C.F.R. § 161.501-.505 (1993). Although a detailed examination of the procedures
is beyond the scope of this article, the regulations first require an attempt at infor-
mal resolution of the conflict after notice to the airport of the apparent violation.
14 C.F.R. § 161.503. If this fails, the FAA proceeds with formal charges that may
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The threat of losing millions of dollars in passenger fa-
cility charges and airway improvement funds has thus far
influenced almost all airport operators to comply with the
provisions of the ANCA. Several airports have been at
odds with the FAA over the details or interpretation of the
ANCA and have tried to push their powers to the legal
limit," t 3 but most have declined to violate the Act
outright.
Due to the fact the ANCA and its regulations were only
recently passed," t4 the full effects of the national aviation
policy have not yet been felt. The FAA and local airports
are still in the process of interpreting the Act and deter-
mining what restrictions local airport operators are per-
mitted to impose consistent with the ANCA. Many of
these details will be worked out in the years ahead
through negotiation and litigation. It is also unclear at
this time who will be the ANCA's ultimate winners and
losers. As the Act is currently interpreted by the FAA, the
airlines appear to be the party who will benefit most.
The airlines benefit from the Act primarily because of
the limitation on airport operators' ability to impose re-
strictions on aircraft operations."15  The ANCA was the
first noise control legislation addressing, on a national
level, the growing problem of inconsistent local noise and
access restrictions at individual airports."16 These incon-
terminate the airport operator's right to collect passenger facility fees and receive
federal funding. Id. § 161.505(a).
I- Both Los Angeles and New York have attempted to assert noise regulation
power that the FAA believed conflicted with the ANCA. In both instances, how-
ever, the cities and the FAA were able to work out a compromise. See FAA to
Oppose Accelerated Aircraft Noise Phaseout Plan of New York, AVIATION DAILY, Nov. 26,
1991, at 351; FAA Officials Take Hard Line Against Further Noise Rules, supra note 108.
"4 The ANCA was passed on November 5, 1990. The regulations implement-
ing the Act were announced September 24, 1991. See Skinner, supra note 83.
- 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2153(b)-(c), 2154.
116 The 1968 Amendment to the 1958 Federal Aviation Act dealt with noise
control only through reduction of noise at the source, namely the airplane. See
supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. The Noise Control Act of 1972 similarly
addressed limitations on aircraft noise at the source instead of restrictions on indi-
vidual airports. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text. Although the Avia-
tion Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979 did deal with the noise problem
through noise compatibility planning and other noise abatement programs, the
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sistent regulations caused serious problems for both ma-
jor air carriers and the FAA in their attempts to provide a
safe, efficient national air transportation system." 7 The
airlines and the Air Line Pilots Association are particularly
concerned with regulations such as inflexible noise cur-
fews which prohibit take-offs or landings at some airports
during certain hours of the night." 8 The airline pilots are
concerned with these curfews because they believe that
the "hard-and-fast curfews rob pilots of valuable time to
ensure that their aircraft are fully prepared for take-
off." ' 9 Opponents of the ANCA's national aviation noise
policy claim that it is a usurpation of powers best left to
the local airport operators. Noise abatement proponents
believe local authorities should have the power to take im-
mediate action on noise, without having to wait for per-
mission from the FAA.' 20 Additionally, many oppose the
increase in federal control.
B. PROBHIBITION ON OPERATION OF CERTAIN AIRCRAFT
The ANCA also addressed the aircraft noise problem
programs were voluntary and did not attempt to coordinate or standardize local
regulations. See supra note 68-80 and accompanying text.
117 Secretary of Transportation Samuel Skinner addressed the issue of restric-
tions on individual airports stating "[b]ecause airports are part of an intercon-
nected national and now international aviation system, these local restrictions can
have ripple effects throughout the country. In some cases, the restrictions make it
difficult, if not impossible, for airlines to schedule their service efficiently." Skin-
ner, supra, note 83. In Burbank, The Supreme Court addressed this issue, stating:
[t]he practice of prohibiting the use of various airports during cer-
tain specific hours could create critically serious problems to all air
transportation patterns. The network of airports throughout the
United States and the constant availability of these airports are es-
sential to the maintenance of a sound air transportation system. The
continuing growth and public acceptance of aviation as a major force
in passenger transportation and the increasingly significant role of
commercial aviation in the nation's economy are accomplishments
which cannot be inhibited if the best interest of the public is to be
served.
Burbank, 411 U.S. at 624.
118 Id.
"19 Pilots Warn That Time-Based Curfews Pose Safety Hazard, AIRPORTS, Mar. 10,
1992, at 94.
120 McKenna, supra note 86.
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through a prohibition on the operation of certain aircraft
based on the aircraft's noise classification. 12 ' The ANCA
provides that after December 31, 1999, no subsonic air-
craft weighing over 75,000 pounds may be operated in or
out of any U.S. airport unless it complies with the Stage
III noise level requirements. 22 The Act instructed the
Secretary to prescribe regulations establishing a schedule
for the phase-out of Stage II aircraft in compliance with
the December 31, 1999 deadline along with interim com-
pliance dates leading up the year 2000.123 To ensure
compliance with the deadline, the Act requires each air
carrier, beginning in 1992, to submit an annual report to
the Secretary on the carrier's progress in complying with
the Stage II phase-out requirement, and requires the Sec-
retary to submit an annual report to Congress on the pro-
gress of the airline industry as a whole. 21
In response to this directive, the FAA has established
two different methods under which air carriers may phase-
out their Stage II aircraft in compliance with the ANCA:
the phase-out option and the phase-in option. 25  Under
121 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2157-2158.
122 Id. § 2157(a). The statute did, however, exempt aircraft which are used ex-
clusively to provide transportation outside the 48 contiguous states. Aircraft not
in compliance with the prohibitions of the ANCA were allowed to be imported
into noncontiguous states so long as they were not used within the 48 contiguous
states. Id. § 2157(d). Air carriers operating out of airports in the State of Hawaii
were not subject to the above exemption. With respect to Hawaiian operations,
the statute provided that domestic and foreign air carriers could not increase the
number of Stage II aircraft weighing more than 75,000 pounds that they operated
within the State of Hawaii or between the State of Hawaii and a point outside the
48 contiguous states after Nov. 5, 1990. In other words, they were limited to their
pre-Nov. 5, 1990 levels.
122 Id. § 2157(c). The Act directed the Secretary to make the recommendations
after a detailed economic analysis. The analysis focused on the impact of the
phase-out on the airline industry, including the ability of air carriers to achieve
capacity growth consistent with the projected rates of growth for the airline indus-
try, the impact of competition within the airline industry, the impact on non-hub
and small community service, the impact on new entry into the airline industry,
and the impact on persons residing near airports. Id.
124 Id. § 2 157(g).
125 Under the phase-out option, the airlines were required to reduce the
number of Stage II aircraft in their fleet by a certain percentage each year. Under
the phase-in option, the airlines were required to reach a certain percentage of
Stage III aircraft in their fleet, whether through the elimination of Stage II aircraft
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the phase-out method, air carriers are required to stop fly-
ing twenty-five percent of their Stage II aircraft by 1994,
fifty percent by 1996, and seventy-five percent by 1998,
and to meet the year-2000 goal of 100% elimination of
Stage II aircraft. 26  United States air carriers strongly
protested this strict deadline for retiring Stage II aircraft,
claiming that the financial burden on the airline industry
from retiring all Stage II aircraft would be crippling eco-
nomically and that some airlines would be hurt worse
than others.' 2 7 As an alternative to the phase-out plan,
the FAA proposed a phase-in option. Under this ap-
proach, an airline may comply with the ANCA require-
ments if the airline's fleet is fifty-five percent Stage III by
1994, sixty-five percent by 1996, and seventy-five percent
by 1998, still with 100% elimination of Stage II aircraft by
2000. 128
To provide an escape for an airline which, due to severe
financial or technological problems, is unable to meet the
year-2000 deadline, 29 the Act contains a provision for
granting waivers from the phase-out deadline. 3 0 The Act
provides that an air carrier may apply for a waiver if, by
July 1, 1999, at least eighty-five percent of the aircraft
used by the carrier to provide transportation are in com-
pliance with the Stage III aircraft standards. The waiver
will apply to the remaining fifteen percent or less of the
or the introduction of more Stage III aircraft. Skinner, supra note 83; see Fotos,
supra note 85.
126 Skinner, supra note 83; Linda Burke, Planned Limits on Louder Jets Irk South-
west, DALLAS TIMES HERALD, Aug. 28, 1991, at BI.
127 Burke, supra note 126. Ken Raf, American Airlines' Director of Fleet Plan-
ning, stated "[i]n our case, most Stage II is fairly old, and we were phasing it out
anyway." Id. at 33. He went on to add "[w]e'd like to think we planned better."
Id. Ron Ricks, Southwest Airlines' vice president of governmental affairs, stated
that some of Southwest's Stage II aircraft were delivered as late as 1985 and that
under the phase-out plan "[w]e will have to stop flying these planes before their
economic life is over, which will make buying new ones more difficult." Id. at 131.
128 Skinner, supra note 83; Fotos, supra note 85.
129 Secretary of Transportation Samuel Skinner stated in his press conference
announcing the details of the Act that in order to obtain waivers, airlines must
"meet a very strong standard. They must be facing severe difficulties, whether
financial or technological in complying." Skinner, supra note 83.
30 49 U.S.C. § 2157(b).
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aircraft in the carrier's fleet.13' The Act requires that the
application for the waiver be filed by January 1, 1999 and
that the application include a plan with firm orders for
bringing into compliance all aircraft used by the air car-
rier to provide air transportation with the Stage III noise
levels by December 31, 2003.132 The Secretary may grant
an air carrier a waiver if, after reviewing the effect of the
waiver on competition in the air carrier industry and small
community service, the Secretary determines that grant-
ing the waiver is in the public interest. 33 These waivers
are limited in duration, however, and may not permit the
operation of Stage II aircraft after December 31, 2003. 31
One final aspect of the phase-out of Stage II aircraft
provided in the ANCA is the "nonaddition rule".' 35 This
rule prohibits the operation of any aircraft weighing over
75,000 pounds which was imported into the United States
after the enactment of the ANCA that is not in compliance
with the Stage III aircraft noise requirements. There are
two exceptions, however. First, the aircraft may be im-
ported and operated in the United States if the aircraft
was purchased by the person importing the aircraft into
the United States under a written contract executed prior
to the enactment of the ANCA. 36 Second, the Secretary
may grant an exemption from the requirements of the
non-addition rule to permit the importer to bring the air-
craft into the United States to obtain modifications to the
aircraft to bring it into conformity with the Stage III re-
quirements. 37 Congress added this provision to the
ANCA in an effort to prevent air carriers from adding new
Stage II aircraft to their fleets, thereby increasing the
noise levels at U.S. airports. Several local airport authori-
ties have enacted similar provisions in an attempt to force
13, Id.
132 Id.
13 Id. § 2157(b)(2).
- Id. § 2157(b)(3).
15 Id. § 2158(a).
136 Id. § 2158(a)(2).
137 Id. § 2158(b).
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air carriers to add only Stage III aircraft operations,
rather than using Stage II aircraft, for additional flights in
or out of the airport.'38  The validity of these local provi-
sions is still unclear.
The mandatory phase-out of Stage II aircraft by the
year-2000 has become one of the most controversial as-
pects of the ANCA. Intended to appease noise control
groups lobbying for elimination of the noisier Stage II air-
craft, the phase-out has drawn sharp criticism from both
sides of the aircraft noise dispute. 13 9 Opponents of the
Act claim the Stage II phase-out will actually be detrimen-
tal to noise abatement efforts for two reasons. First, they
believe the phase-out of Stage II aircraft has not
progressed quickly enough. Noise control advocates be-
lieve the phase-in option for eliminating Stage II aircraft
will actually make the aircraft noise problem worse in the
early years of the phase-out by putting more aircraft in the
air. 140 Noise groups want the Stage II aircraft out of the
air as soon as possible and believe the flexibility given to
air carriers by the phase-in option will keep Stage II air-
craft in the air too long. 4 ' These groups would like the
FAA to require the airlines to eliminate Stage II aircraft
,18 Both New York and San Francisco have attempted to add these new non-
addition rules for their airports. These local provisions require individual air car-
tiers to at the minimum maintain the same percentage of Stage III operations at
the airport. The ANCA's regulations concerning non-addition of Stage II aircraft
apply to individual air carriers, fleets as a whole, not to flights in or out of a partic-
ular city. As a result, the FAA claims the local nonaddition rules are a violation of
the ANCA. San Francisco Enacts Noise Rule Changes Despite FAA Warning, AvIATION
DAILY, June 5, 1991, at 445; FAA to Oppose Accelerated Aircraft Noise Phaseout Plan of
New York, AVIATION DAILY, Nov. 26, 1991, at 351.
39 Airports Concerned with FAA Proposal on Stage 2 Restrictions, AIRPORTS, Mar. 5,
1991, at 98 [hereinafter Airports Concerned]; FAA Has Noise Reduction Proposal to Please
Everybody-and Nobody, supra note 86.
140 Noise control advocates believe that the majority of air carriers will adopt
the phase-in approach instead of the phase-out. They assert that as the air carri-
ers add new Stage III aircraft to their fleets to meet the fleet mix percentages
established by the ANCA, they will keep the noisier Stage II aircraft flying and
thereby create more aircraft flying, more flights in and out of airports, and there-
fore more noise. See Skinner, supra note 83; McKenna, supra note 86.
'4' Noise control groups assert that the phase-in option is not designed to
quickly eliminate Stage II aircraft, but rather is meant to keep the Stage II planes
flying as long as possible up to the year 2000 deadline. McKenna, supra note 86.
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from their fleets by phasing them out, not by phasing
Stage III aircraft in, and would also like to allow local air-
ports to retain the power to limit or eliminate Stage II air-
craft operations on their own, in advance of the phase-out
mandated by the ANCA. 4 2
Noise control advocates and local airport proprietors
are also unhappy with the ANCA because they believe the
FAA will eventually make the strict procedures imposed
on local airport operators implementing Stage III restric-
tions 43 applicable to Stage II aircraft restrictions as
well. 144 Under the current provisions of the ANCA, air-
port operators believe they will be able to impose limited
restrictions on Stage II aircraft. If the strict procedures
applied to Stage III aircraft are applied to Stage II air-
craft, airport proprietors fear they will be completely
stripped of their power to impose noise restrictions on
Stage II aircraft. Many airport proprietors and local noise
control groups believe the power to impose restrictions
on Stage III aircraft is illusory because of the required
FAA approval. 45 Requiring FAA approval of Stage II re-
strictions would further reduce the power of airport
operators.
Although they have accepted the ANCA's Stage II
phase-out provisions, air carriers are also not completely
happy with the provisions. Initially, the regulations im-
plementing the Stage II phase-out called for a phase-out
of all Stage II aircraft, requiring a twenty-five percent re-
duction of a carrier's Stage II aircraft by 1992, fifty per-
142 FAA Olicials Take Hard Line Against Further Noise Rules, supra note 108.
143 For restrictions on Stage III aircraft, the Act requires either agreement be-
tween the airport operator and air carriers or approval by the FAA. 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 2153(b).
144 Airports Concerned, supra note 139. The ANCA currently allows individual air-
port proprietors to implement restrictions on Stage II aircraft after a 180-day no-
tice period and the filing of a report detailing an analysis of the costs and benefits
of the restriction. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2153(c), 2154.
, FAA approval of restrictions on Stage III aircraft is expected to be rare. Air-
port operators and noise control groups believe applying a similar standard to
Stage II restrictions would have similar results. Christopher P. Fotos, Proposed
Stage 2 Aircraft Ban Leaves Carriers and Airports in Dark Over U.S. Noise Policy, AVIA-
TION WK. AND SPACE TECH., Mar. 11, 1991, at 35.
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cent by 1996, seventy-five percent by 1998, and finally
100% by the year 2000.46 Air carriers oppose this plan
because they believe it will financially cripple the industry,
and instead favor a flexible approach allowing them to
keep Stage II aircraft in operation longer. 47 In response
to the air carriers' objections, the FAA developed the al-
ternative phase-in option. This plan allows the carriers to
keep Stage II aircraft in operation so long as they add suf-
ficient Stage III aircraft to meet set fleet mix percent-
ages. ' 48 Air carriers have lessened their opposition to the
Stage II phase-out after the introduction of the more flex-
ible phase-in option, but it is unclear whether they will
continue to support the phase-out as the compliance
dates grow near-and the airlines begin to feel the ANCA's
financial impact. 49
The area of the ANCA which is the biggest improve-
ment over earlier Congressional acts is the strict deadline
for the phase-out of Stage II aircraft. 50 Although previ-
ous acts imposed deadlines for the phase-out of Stage II
aircraft, the liberal exemption and waiver provisions of
these acts prevented the acts from having any significant
16 Burke, supra note 126.
17 One of the plans put forth, which was eventually rejected, called for the
phase-out to proceed according to the initial regulations, but would have allowed
airlines exceeding the percentage of Stage II aircraft required to be phased out to
sell the right to operate Stage II aircraft to other air carriers not meeting the
deadline. Weaker air carriers opposed this transfer plan because of the potential
for serious anti-competitive effects. Many Airlines Support Flexible Schedule for Reduc-
ing Stage 2 Aircraft in Fleet, AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 17, 1991; Burke, supra note 126.
,48 Under the fleet mix plan, the air carrier had to have a certain percentage
Stage III aircraft. The percentages were set at 55% by 1994, 657o by 1996, 75%
by 1998, and 100% by the year 2000. Skinner, supra note 83.
119 The FAA estimates that the cost of the Stage II phase-out will be $6 billion.
The Air Transport Association believes the total phase-out costs in 1990 dollars
will reach $90 billion. Many Airlines Support Flexible Schedule for Reducing Stage 2 Air-
craft in Fleet, supra note 147. Many airlines have already taken significant steps to
reach the year 2000 deadline. Reports filed by U.S. air carriers for 1991 indicate
that only three major carriers had not yet reached the fleet mix required for the
1994 deadline. Two of the carriers, American Airlines and America West, had
already met the 1996 requirements. Most Majors Meet FAA's First Interim Noise Re-
quirement, AVIATION DAILY, July 29, 1992, at 171.
50 49 U.S.C. app. § 2157(b)(3).
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effect on the makeup of the commercial air fleet.""' The
drafters of the ANCA hoped to avoid the failure of these
earlier acts by including a final, definite limit on the
length of any extension or waiver of the phase-out re-
quirements of the act.' 52 Maintaining this 2003 deadline
for all waivers is crucial to any serious program to elimi-
nate Stage II aircraft and reduce aircraft noise. Congress
will have to hold firm to this deadline and resist pressure
to extend the Stage II phase-out deadline if the ANCA is
to be successful in removing Stage II aircraft from the
skies.
Congress' ability to hold firm on the phase-out deadline
will likely rest on two factors. First, for the Stage II phase-
out to succeed, the financial health of the airline industry
must improve such that they are able to bear the financial
burden of phasing-out Stage II planes and replace them
with Stage III aircraft or retrofitted Stage II aircraft. 5 3 At
the present time, the U.S. airline industry is in financial
shambles. Losses for the major U.S. airlines in the past
three years have totaled nearly $8 billion. 54 In 1992, the
losses for the three largest U.S. airlines alone approached
$2.5 billion. 55 Air carriers must regain their financial
15, The first major attempt to mandate a phase-out of older Stage II aircraft was
the 1976 order by the Secretary of Transportation that all air carriers comply with
the FAR 36 standards by January 1, 1985. See supra note 69. Due to the financial
burden this imposed on U.S. air carriers, the Aviation Noise and Safety Act of
1979 granted air carriers exemptions from the 1985 deadline for both two and
three engine aircraft. These deadlines were extended until 1988, and then be-
yond. The fact that the ANCA addresses phasing out the same type of aircraft
clearly illustrates the failure of these earlier phaseout deadlines.
152 49 U.S.C. app. § 2157(b)(3). The act provides: "A waiver granted under this
subsection may not permit the operation of Stage II aircraft in the United States
after December 31, 2003."
15 Retrofitting the aircraft requires either the installation of a hush kit to make
the jets' existing engines meet the Stage III requirements or the re-engining the
aircraft with engines that meet the Stage III noise requirements.
15 Aviation: Financial Condition Of Airline Industry A Major Concern, Daily Rep. for
Executives, (BNA) 28 (Feb. 12, 1993).
155 The three largest airlines- American, United, and Delta- lost a combined
$2.46 billion. AMR Corp., parent of American Airlines, lost $935 million. UAL
Corp., United Airlines' parent, lost $956.8 million. Delta reported a $546.8 mil-
lion 1992 loss. The other smaller U.S. airlines also reported losses: U.S. Air
Group, parent of U.S. Air., lost $1.23 billion; Continental Airlines Holdings, par-
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strength if they are to bear the financial burdens of elimi-
nating their Phase II aircraft. 156
Second, the success in the Stage II aircraft phase-out
will depend in large part on advances in the production of
hush kits and other retrofitting technology altering Stage
II aircraft engines to meet the Stage III noise require-
ments. 57 A subsidiary of Federal Express Corp., Federal
Express Aviation Services, Inc. (FEASI), has recently won
certification for hush kits for Boeing 727 aircraft. 158
FEASI has produced two separate kits: a regular kit and a
heavyweight version for aircraft up to 199,500 pounds. 59
These kits allow air carriers to modify their Stage II air-
craft to meet the Stage III specifications without going to
the expense of purchasing a new airplane or fitting new
engines on existing Stage II aircraft. 60 If FEASI and
other companies can mass produce the hush kits in suffi-
cient numbers to allow air carriers to use them to meet
the phase-out deadlines, the kits will sharply reduce the
ent of Continental Airlines, which is currently in bankruptcy, lost $125.3 million;
American West, also in bankruptcy, lost $132 million. Southwest Airlines was the
only U.S. airline to post a profit in 1992. Southwest reported a 1992 profit of
$103.6 million. Losses for Three Largest U.S. Airlines Approach $2.5 Billion in 1992,
AIRPORTS, Feb. 2, 1993, at 46.
116 In a move which does not speak well for the future of the U.S. airline indus-
try, KLM Royal Dutch Airways, which invested $400 million in Northwest Airlines
in 1989, recently reduced the book value of their Northwest investment to zero
and took the amount of their investment as a loss in their 1992 earnings state-
ment. This move reflects the fact that KLM does not expect Northwest to pull out
of a recent financial slump and repay the investment. David Phelps, NWA '92
Losses Exceed $1 Billion; KLM Values Its Investment at Zero, STAR TRIBUNE, Feb. 5,
1993, at Al.
15, The hush kits alter the engines' noise output through respaced inlet guide
vanes, acoustic tailpipe extensions, modified engine pylons and load bearing
structures and other components. David Yawn, Hush, Hush, Sweet 727's, MEMPHIS
Bus. J., Mar. 30, 1992, P. 1.
158 Federal Express Receives 727-200 Noise Reduction Kit Certification, AIRLINE FIN.
NEWS, Apr. 6, 1992.
159 Id.
-B The hush kits provided by FEASI begin at $1.65 million per aircraft and the
heavyweight kits cost $2.45 million per aircraft. The hush kits can be installed in
800 to 1,200 man-hours for the standard kit, and 3,000 to 4,000 for the heavy-
weight kit, at a cost of about $40 per hour. Purchasing a new aircraft costs be-
tween $40-$50 million per jet, and re-engining an aircraft costs approximately $9
million per jet. Yawn, supra note 157.
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burden on the airlines' finances.' 6 ' It remains to be seen
whether the manufacturing capabilities for retrofitting
technology will be able to keep up with demand and be-
come a significant factor in reducing the financial burden
of noise abatement.
VI. CONCLUSION
"In the year 2000 we'll still be sitting here talking about
noise unless something radical is done."'16 2 These words
by the executive director of the Minneapolis-St. Paul Met-
ropolitan Airports Commission at a public meeting on air-
craft noise illustrate the depth of the problem society
faces today with aircraft noise and the fact that the prob-
lem will only get worse if significant steps are not taken to
correct it. In examining the aircraft noise problem, it is
important to realize that no one group can solve the prob-
lem on its own. Local government, airport operators,
land developers, potential property owners, aircraft and
engine manufacturers, airlines and the federal govern-
ment all have a part to play in developing a solution to
this increasing problem. 163 As the only party with the ju-
risdiction and authority to take the action needed to solve
the noise problem, the federal government must take the
lead on this issue and continue to develop a comprehen-
sive noise abatement program. The Airport Noise and
Capacity Act of 1990 is a significant step in the right direc-
tion in solving the aircraft noise problem, but like other
Congressional acts, the ANCA likely will not completely
solve the problem.
Additional measures should be taken to assure that the
aircraft noise problem is brought under control now and
does not grow worse in the future. First, and most impor-
tantly, work should begin now on the next generation of
16, Federal Express initially began the hush kit project to meet their own in
house needs. Federal Express is one of the largest operators of Boeing 727's in
the world. Id.
162 Harper, supra note 45, at 166.
163 Id. at 158.
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aircraft with noise levels below those of the Stage III air-
craft currently being placed into operation. In response
to federal legislation, Stage II aircraft, and later Stage III
aircraft were developed to meet tightening federal regula-
tions on maximum noise levels. Now, before the problem
becomes more severe, the FAA should establish Stage IV
noise limits and encourage aircraft manufacturers to be-
gin developing Stage IV technology. To retire or retrofit
a fleet of planes in an economically practicable manner
takes many years if not an entire decade. The aircraft in-
dustry should avoid a financial crunch in the future by be-
ginning a push for better technology today. This will
allow airlines to plan their fleet modernizations in a man-
ner which will not result in the retirement of aircraft
before it is economically practicable. If necessary, Con-
gress should enact legislation to encourage the develop-
ment of aircraft with lower noise levels, either by mandate
or through incentives.
A second area in which the federal government can be
of assistance in reducing noise is in helping air carriers
obtain financing to meet the year 2000 deadline. Airlines
frequently receive exemptions from meeting the phase-
out schedules because of the financial hardship of retiring
older planes before planned and the high costs of
purchasing new planes or retrofit kits. Rather than grant-
ing exemptions and allowing these noisy planes to remain
in the air, the government should assist air carriers in
meeting the deadline by arranging financing with banks,
guaranteeing bank loans, granting federal loans, or simply
through a system of federal grants. These grants can be
financed through fuel or passenger user taxes. The FAA
should create a fund similar to the Airway Trust Fund,
which helps airports finance noise compatibility pro-
grams, to help with the cost of the Stage II phase-out.
Finally, the FAA needs to establish a long term, com-
prehensive plan to deal with the aircraft noise problem
well into the next century. The ANCA provided for the
phasing-out of Stage II aircraft over a ten year period.
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What U.S. airlines and airport operators need is a long
term plan looking twenty to thirty years into the future.
The plan need not contain specifics, but should state fu-
ture goals for the industry and provide a framework for
airlines and airports to make their long range plans. The
FAA should state changes anticipated in the future and
make recommendations regarding areas which need fur-
ther innovation, such as quieter engines. A long-term
plan would let aviation manufacturers know what types of
planes to produce, tell airlines what types of planes to buy
and which ones to phase-out, and enable airport planners
to make adequate plans for airport expansion and the use
of land surrounding the airport. Instead of reacting to a
crisis with legislation, as was the case with the ANCA, the
FAA should focus on legislating around the next set of
problems before reaching a crisis point.
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